THE PEACE PROCESS

The lesson to be learned is that when an established state and a rebel movement are negotiating toward a peaceful resolution, they have a formidable common enemy: the deep-seated and widespread prejudice held not by the negotiating parties but by their respective constituencies. In this case, the prejudice is centuries old, born of the Moro wars waged between the colonial government in Manila and the Sultanates of Southern Philippines.

That is why only strong leaders can negotiate peace effectively. Nur Misuari could negotiate the Tripoli Agreement because his leadership of the MNLF was strong enough to withstand even the challenge of a popular ustadj like Hashim Salamat. He could negotiate the Final Peace Agreement because nobody in the organization was strong enough and had the nerve to challenge his leadership. On the government side, President Ferdinand E. Marcos could negotiate the Tripoli Agreement because he was actually a dictator who ruled with the trappings of a democracy. 

President Cory Aquino could negotiate with the MNLF because she was the immaculate icon of the People Power Revolution of 1986, who ruled under a Revolutionary Constitution; but when the 1987 Constitution was already in place, she became very conscious of the limits of her power.

President Ramos could negotiate in 1993 because he had plenty of political capital due to his heroics during the People Power Revolution and his success in suppressing the unpopular military coup attempts against the Cory Aquino administration. One source of his strength was the firm support of a great majority of military officers and personnel who considered him one of their own. Even a strong leader, however, is not guaranteed of success in pushing for a negotiating position without the support of a wide and committed coalition of constituencies. That would be another lesson to be learned.

LESSONS LEARNED in PDF Format can be downloaded from this link :

⇒ https://asean-aipr.org/media/library/0ed9422357395a0d4879191c66f4faa2.pdf